While other sectors of the Indian economy enjoyed limited productivity growth under the British Raj, railways were an exception. In this paper, we present new estimates of total factor productivity (TFP) using railway-level data on outputs and inputs from 1874 to 1912. We estimate railway-industry TFP growth and find it to be substantial averaging between 2.0 and 2.6 percent per year from 1874 to 1912. We also find that capacity utilization is secondary in importance, suggesting a role for technological change. Finally, we show that TFP growth on Indian railways accounted for 12 percent of Indian GDP per capita growth from 1874 to 1912.
Introduction
Railways were the most significant infrastructure development of the 19 th century. After railways arrived, trade costs declined in most countries resulting in large increases in traffic volumes. The experience of colonial India was no exception. Given the poor state of existing transportation networks, railways completely transformed the infrastructure of the subcontinent by connecting the ports to major industrial and commercial centers in the interior of the country. Despite the documented benefits of Indian railways on price convergence and trade flows (Hurd 1983 , Andrabi and Kuelhwein 2009 , Donaldson 2010 , economic historians have offered a pessimistic assessment of the sector largely because the arrival of railways did not lead to significant economic growth (Thorner 1955 , 1977 , Hurd 2007 ). Such views generally hold colonial railway policy responsible for the lack of economic development (Thorner 1955 ).
We assess the performance of Indian railways by presenting new estimates of total factor productivity (TFP) from 1874 to 1912. If Indian railways failed to achieve a higher rate of TFP growth relative to other sectors of the economy or had slower TFP growth than railways in other countries, then this would be evidence for some type of 'failure.' On the other hand, if TFP growth was rapid then the performance of the sector needs to be reassessed. Our approach combines detailed railway-level data with modern econometric techniques and offers a range of TFP estimates based on different methodologies. Previous studies have calculated labor and capital productivity (Christensen 1981 , Hurd 2007 ), but to date none of them account for fuel and capital changes or estimate TFP. Unlike studies relying on aggregate data, our paper is among a small group of recent papers that use railway-level data to estimate productivity in the railway sector (see Loncan 2006, Crafts,
Mulatu and Leunig 2009, Dodgson 2011).
Our panel data covers 32 railways over a 38-year period. These railways jointly account for more than 95 percent of total output in Indian railways. We rely on official reports to construct the necessary variables needed for the productivity analysis: ton miles, passenger miles, track miles, locomotives, vehicles, capital outlay, fuel and number of employees. The analysis begins in 1874 when the output series become usable and ends in 1912 just before the beginning of the War. Since the data series change after the War, we restrict our focus in this study to the pre-World War 1 period. Although the data sources are rich in details, they are not without problems. First, the fuel inputs are inconsistently reported over the years as Indian railways transitioned from British coal to Indian coal. Second, the reported capital outlay series are constructed similar to the perpetual inventory method, but annual investment is not converted into constant prices. To address these issues we construct a quality adjusted fuel series and new capital stock series using real investment.
We estimate TFP at the railway-level according to the traditional Index Number method with UK, US and Indian weights for capital, labor and fuel. Next, we calculate TFP as a residual from an estimated production function. There are several methods to estimate the coefficients of a production function. The main concern with using ordinary least squares is the potential correlation between unobserved productivity shocks and input choices. To address such endogeneity problems we present both fixed effects estimates that control for all railway-level time invariant shocks and Levinsohn-Petrin estimates that use intermediate inputs such as fuel to get around the simultaneity problem (Levinsohn and Petrin 2003) .
Fortunately in our case, the TFP estimates do not differ substantially and offer the same qualitative picture.
Using the railway-level TFP estimates, we calculate annual industry-level TFP using output shares as weights. We find evidence of significant TFP growth in the Indian railway sector regardless of the method. Our best estimates suggest that TFP grew by between 2 and 2.6 percent per year. TFP growth was especially high in the 1900s ranging from 2.3 to 3.4 percent per year.
The performance of Indian railways stands in stark contrast to the rest of the Indian economy in this period. Between 1890/91 and 1910/11, the growth rate of TFP in the Indian economy is estimated to have been negative at -0.8 percent per year (Broadberry and Gupta 2010) compared to at least 1.4 percent in railways. The poor productivity performance of the overall economy is largely driven by the low productivity in agriculture, which accounted for almost 75 percent of the total labor force up to Indian independence in 1947. But, even among the modern sectors railways were significantly more productive. For example, labor productivity growth in cotton textiles, an important manufacturing sector, was very low if not zero (Clark 1987, Clark and Wolcott 1999) .
One may be concerned the TFP measures are not picking up evidence of productivity, such as better organization or technical efficiency, but rather reflect greater capacity utilization spurred by an increase in the demand for railway services. Clearly, utilization affects railway TFP because tracks and vehicles sit idle when trains are not running. If greater capacity utilization is not due to improvements in organization methods such as loading and train turn-around times, then one may question if greater utilization should be viewed as TFP growth. To assess the quantitative significance of capacity utilization on TFP growth, we modify the production function estimation to include utilization variables, such as train miles run per track mile. The TFP estimates are 85 to 90 percent of the original estimates after accounting for utilization suggesting capacity utilization is not the sole source of TFP.
We believe technological and organizational changes drove a significant portion of the TFP growth on Indian railways. Consistent with this view, we find that Indian railways adopted a number of best-practice technologies in the early 1900s such as vacuum brakes, electrical lighting and bogie wagons. The Government of India also became a majority owner of the rail network over this period and improving the performance of railways was an important state objective (Bogart and Chaudhary 2011) . Several official reports published in this period note the importance of improving efficiency and performance in the sector.
Official efforts appear to have paid off because TFP growth rates on Indian railways were similar to more developed economies such as the United States.
The growth in railway TFP has important implications for the development of the Indian economy. As a final exercise we estimate the contribution of railway TFP growth to GDP per capita growth using Crafts (2004) new growth accounting framework. We find railway TFP growth contributed between 0.06 and 0.08 percent per year to Indian GDP per capita from 1874 to 1912. Including railways' additions to the aggregate capital stock raises the total contribution to around 0.1 percent per year or 17 percent of the total increase in GDP per capita.
Converted into social savings, the estimates imply TFP growth on Indian railways increased national income by 6 to 7 percent between 1874 and 1912. The gains from railways were stifled to some degree because railways were a small sector of the Indian economy.
Unlike Britain and the U.S., railway revenues in India represented less than 3 percent of national income in 1913. Our calculations of the growth impact are broadly consistent with other estimates that use different methodologies (for example, Hurd 1983 and Donaldson 2010) Unlike other approaches, the growth accounting framework emphasizes the importance of TFP growth.
Our paper complements a long line of studies on Indian railways including McAlpin (1974), Hurd (1975 Hurd ( , 2007 , Adams and West (1979) , Derbyshire (2007) , and Kerr (2007) . We also contribute to the cross-country literature on railway productivity and efficiency (for th and early 20 th century India, railways were an engine of growth in an otherwise slow changing economy.
2 Background on Indian Railways
After the first passenger line opened in 1853, the subsequent development of the rail network was rapid especially in the 1880s and 1890s. By the early 20th century, India had the fourth largest rail network in the world and was of similar or greater size than Brazil, China and Japan, but smaller than the Unites States that had the largest rail network in the world. Private British companies backed by a Government of India (GOI) guarantee managed the initial construction and operation of the lines. Beginning in the 1870s, the GOI began to construct new lines and in the 1880s a hybrid GOI owned but privately operated structure emerged. The Princely States were also involved in railways with many of them outsourcing the construction and operations to private companies. The publicprivate partnership model was the dominant organization form till the 1920s when complete nationalization was gradually introduced (Bogart and Chaudhary 2011).
The initial network was constructed on a broad 5 feet 6 inches gauge and consisted of trunk lines connecting the major ports of Bombay, Calcutta, Karachi and Madras to the interior. Subsequent lines broke from the standard gauge and were constructed on a cheaper meter gauge. These lines often served as feeder lines connecting to the main trunk route. A few narrow gauge (2 inches) lines were also constructed connecting to different hill stations. While economic and military concerns dictated route placement in the earlier decades (Thorner 1955) , social concerns following the devastating famines of the 1870s lead to the construction of some protective famine lines in the 1880s. There were also several mergers in the late 19th century and early 20th century between the trunk lines and other lines operating in the area. Figure 1 displays the rail network as of 1909.
Our sample of railways includes all the major standard and meter gauge railways operating between 1874 and 1912. Table 1 lists each railway in the sample noting its gauge, entry and exit date. The exits are due to mergers with other lines. Nine railways were operating at the start of our period in 1874 and continued to operate until 1912. They largely represented the initial trunk lines. Our sample also includes nine railways that began operations after 1874 but continued to operate until 1912. Many of these were built on the meter gauge and some were designated as famine lines. The remaining fourteen railways began operations after 1874 but ceased to operate by 1912 because of mergers. Other than a few exceptions, these lines were often of smaller size compared to the principal trunk lines to which they merged. Because we are interested in industry-level TFP, we include information on all lines in our dataset even if they subsequently merge.
In the literature, railway companies are viewed with some skepticism. Hurd (2007) argues that railways missed opportunities for development and that management was often complacent. The critique of railways fits into a larger view that the colonial Indian economy failed to achieve growth. However, railway performance has not been assessed by a clear metric. In particular, there is no estimate of TFP growth to compare with other sectors and railways in other countries. In part data has been one of the stumbling blocks. We now turn to a discussion of a new data set, which we use to address TFP.
Data
We construct a new data set of Indian railways from 1874 to 1912 using Administration Reports on the Railways in India, published annually from 1884, and the Report to the Secretary of State for India in Council on Railways in India, published annually from 1860 to 1883. The Report to the Secretary is less detailed than the Administration Reports, but we were able to obtain information on ton miles (i.e. the number of tons carried one mile), passenger miles, track miles, locomotives, vehicles, fuel, labor, and the value of capital starting in 1874. The data are reported annually before 1900 and for each half year after 1900. For the post-1900 variables, we sum the variables over the two half-years to construct an annual observation.
Similar to the transportation literature, we use ton miles and passenger miles to measure output. 1 The TFP analysis requires a single output measure and the convention is to use a weighted average of ton miles and passenger miles. Following Caves, Christensen, and
Swanson (1980) we define the weights using the cost elasticity of ton miles and passenger miles. Based on an earlier study (Bogart and Chaudhary 2011) that calculates cost elasticity estimates, we assign a weight of 0.56 to ton miles and a weight of 0.44 to passenger miles.
As a robustness check we also use the annual revenue shares for each railway as weights.
In addition to output, we construct annual series for labor, fuel, and capital inputs.
Labor is the total number of railway workers. The data are disaggregated into Europeans, Anglo-Indians, and Native Indians with the latter representing over 95 percent of total workers on average. The small number of Europeans dominated among the high skilled jobs of managers and engine drivers, while Indians dominated in the lower skill jobs. The analysis uses total employees as our measure of labor, but disaggregation by race does not affect the results. The years from 1882 to 1889 are the most challenging because we only have information on the total tons of fuel consumed without any information on the type of fuel. While there are notes describing the fuel type, they do not give the precise breakdown. We use a three-step procedure in this period. First, we calculate a fuel quality adjustment factor for 1881 and 1890, the nearest years for which we have the detailed information on fuel type. Second, we linearly interpolate the quality adjustment factor between 1881 and 1890. Third,
we multiply the quality adjustment factor with the total tons of fuel consumed to yield an 2 The Reports omit tons of fuel consumed in 1875 and 1876. We interpolate the tons for each railway using observations in 1874 and 1877.
3 If a railway consumed only British coal in both 1881 and 1890, their quality adjustment factor would be 1.25 because 1 ton of British coal normally yielded 1.25 tons of Kurhurbaree coal. If they consumed only Indian coal, their adjustment factor would be between 0.8 and 1 depending on the variety used.If they consumed only Kuruhbaree coal, their adjustment factor would naturally be one. Since the other Indian varieties were inferior to Kuruharbaree coal, their adjustment factor would be less than one.
estimate of the tons of Kurhurbaree coal consumed by each railway. 4 We measure capital in two ways. First, we use the number of track miles, locomotive engines, and vehicles (i.e. wagons and carriages) as three separate capital inputs. But, there are a few potential problems with this approach. Track miles were built on different gauges, and engines and wagons differed in terms of design. Our baseline model does not adjust for quality because there is no obvious procedure to account for these differences. While we can control for time-invariant differences using fixed effects in the productivity estimates, quality still remains an issue. The second problem is that track miles, locomotive engines, and vehicles represent most but not all the capital inputs. Capital also included stations, warehouses, bridges, and stores of other equipment. Our second approach addresses the breadth issue by providing a comprehensive measure of capital.
The Reports state total capital outlay by each railway in each year, which includes the cumulative value of all past investments (i.e. new track, vehicles, etc.) minus retirements.
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To construct an estimate of nominal investment less depreciation, we begin by taking the yearly difference in the capital outlay series. 6 We then construct a real investment series by multiplying nominal investment with a capital price deflator. Finally a capital stock measure is constructed for each railway using the perpetual inventory method, which adds yearly real investment to the previous years' capital stock.
Our capital price deflator equals a weighted average of unskilled wages in India and the prices of British railway capital imports because unskilled labor and British capital were the key inputs in railway construction (Kerr 1983 There are some special cases that required a modified method. For Madras and Southern Mahratta railways fuel is always expressed in terms of wood. We use the conversion rate from wood to Kurhurbaree coal from the 1891 report. For Nizam fuel is always expressed in terms of wood up to 1887 when there is a shift to coal. We use the 1891 adjustment factor in 1888, 1889, and 1890 for Nizam. The Punjab Northern railway, Indus Valley railway, and Sind, Punjab, Delhi railways were merged to form the Northwestern railway system in 1886. We used the average adjustment factor for the three railways in 1881 and the Northwestern in 1891 to calculate a single interpolation for all three before the merger.
5 Morris and Dudley (1975) are critical of the capital series because it does not include the value of land, which was provided free of charge to the various railway companies among numerous other complaints. While we are sympathetic to the issues they highlight, we do not believe the measurement error is large enough to render the series unusable. The types of issues they raise can also be addressed by including year and railway fixed effects in the estimation procedure. 6 Capital outlay is measured in pounds before 1882 and rupees afterwards. Therefore, we convert nominal investment into rupees before 1882 using the pound-rupee market exchange rate 7 We convert the series into rupees using the market exchange rate. respectively. The other measures of capital namely engines, miles and vehicles also show evidence of productivity growth. The relatively flat series on fuel productivity suggests the transition from British coal and wood to Indian coal did not generate huge productivity gains. In fact, fuel productivity was negative in the 1890s and 1900s when the transition to different varieties of Indian coal was almost complete. These partial productivity measures suggest we should find some TFP growth in Indian railways.
Methodology
We focus on the production function approach to estimating total factor productivity (TFP) similar to other studies on transportation (Oum, Waters, and Yu 1999). In this framework output is assumed to be the product of a function of inputs (labor, capital and fuel) and a factor neutral shifter representing TFP:
where Y is output, and F is a function of the inputs namely labor (L), capital (K) and fuel (M ), and A is TFP. As is common in the literature, we assume a Cobb Douglas production 8 The wage data between 1850 and 1874 is not consistently available for all the regions. The available evidence from the United Provinces suggests nominal wages rose in this period. We apply the United Provinces wage growth rate to all regions.
9 Based on our constructed series, we believe the capital series reported in the official publications probably under states the capital stock. For example, based on our estimates the East Indian railway had 15 percent more capital by 1881 than the reported capital outlay. The main reason is that labor and railway capital goods were less expensive in the 1850s when the East Indian built its railway. function for F ( ) and then productivity is defined as:
where α l , α k and α m are the output elasticity with respect to labor, capital, and fuel respectively. 10 In the Cobb Douglas case if the sum of α l , α k and α m is greater than one, then doubling the inputs would generate more than double the output. Thus scale economies provide another channel for increasing output.
Once we know the output elasticity with respect to labor, capital, and fuel, the TFP calculation is trivial. The problem is the elasticities are unobservable and need to be estimated or calculated. One simple solution assumes perfect competition and constant returns to scale in which case, the elasticity equals the share of revenues paid to each input. Taking logs of equation (2) and replacing each elasticity with the appropriate factor share yields an estimate of the log of TFP of each railway in each year:
where lower case letters correspond to natural logs of TFP, outputs, and inputs, subscript i refers to railways, and subscript t refers to year. Such a calculation generates the so-called Index Number (IN) estimate of TFP. We report IN estimates because it is standard in the railways productivity literature.
However, it is well known that markets for railway services are not perfectly competitive and the assumption of constant returns to scale is also questionable. Moreover, factor shares are not directly observable in our data. Aggregate figures and evidence from the East Indian Railway suggest that capital received an approximate share of 0.55, labor 0.3, and fuel 0.15. Fishlow (1966) assumes shares of 0.52, 0.38, and 0.1 for capital, labor, and fuel respectively on US railroads. We report results using the aggregate Indian, British and US weights.
In general, our data are better suited to a parametric estimation of TFP. 12 The goal in this approach is to estimate the elasticity of labor, capital, and fuel using regressions. In the Cobb Douglas case the estimating equation is:
10 TFP would similarly be defined for the translog production function, which nests the Cobb Douglas. 11 The Reports indicate that working expenses equaled 45 percent of total revenues on average from 1882 to 1912, with the implication that 55 percent of revenues were paid to the owners of capital. Unfortunately there is no information indicating what proportion of the remaining 45 percent of revenues went to labor versus fuel. 12 We refer the reader to Van Biesebroeck (2008) for the debate in the productivity literature on whether index number methods are inferior to estimation methods.
where the variables are the same as before and ε it is the error term. After obtaining estimates of the input elasticities, the log of TFP is calculated as the residual:
where α's are the estimated parameters.
The main challenge in parametric estimation is to obtain unbiased estimates of the elasticities. The standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates are likely to be biased because input choices may depend on unobserved productivity shocks, which enter the error term (Griliches and Mareisse 1998). There are several alternatives to get around this endogeneity problem. The most straightforward is to introduce fixed effects when panel data is available. Following this approach the estimating equation in the Cobb Douglas model is:
where ϕ i is a railway system fixed effect and δ t is a year fixed effect. The log of TFP is again inputs and the fixed effects, but assumes independence between inputs and the error term. In other words, FE cannot control for any time varying unobserved productivity shocks at the railway level that may bias the coefficients on α l , α k , and α m .
Since the FE approach only exploits the within variation, researchers have also proposed alternative estimators that control for the simultaneity problem by exploiting the crosssectional variation in the data. Olley and Pakes (1996) is one such approach, which uses investment as a proxy for unobserved productivity shocks. We use the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) correction that builds on Olley and Pakes but with less stringent data requirements.
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The Levinsohn and Petrin estimator relies on intermediate inputs such as materials, electricity or fuel to proxy for productivity shocks. This correction is the most appropriate for our setting because we have a consistent series on fuel, the intermediate input in our setting, and our data appears to meet the specification tests described in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) .
Thus, we use these different approaches namely IN, FE and Levinsohn-Petrin, to generate railway level TFP estimates for each year. We then calculate the log of industry TFP as the output weighted average of individual railway TFP measures. Let θ it be the share in total output for railway i in year t and let N be the number of railways. The natural log of industry TFP in year t is given by the formula:
5 Results
We discuss the results in four separate sub-sections. The first section reviews the input coefficients on capital, labor and fuel across the different estimation techniques described above. Section 5.2 presents the results on industry-level TFP and sections 5.3 and 5.4 examine capacity utilization and technological change to better understand the sources of TFP growth. Since OLS is likely to be biased, we report these coefficients for comparison only. Specification (2) adds railway fixed effects (FE) to the model. Other than engines, all the remaining input coefficients have a positive sign and are significant at the 5 percent level. Fuel has the highest estimated output elasticity followed by vehicles, miles, and labor. The elasticity of engines is indistinguishable from zero. Adding all the coefficients yields an estimate for scale economies of 1.06, but the hypothesis of constant returns to scale cannot be statistically rejected. Specification (3) uses the revenue-weighted output measure as a robustness check and the coefficients are not significantly different from those reported in specification (2), our standard cost weighted output.
Input Coefficient Estimates
One disadvantage of using the number of capital units as in specification (1) to (3) is these measures just count the number of miles, vehicles and engines without taking into account any quality changes. This is of particular concern in our setting because the quality of locomotive engines was continuously changing. Such changes can generate an upward or downward bias on the individual capital coefficients depending on whether the existing capital stock was replaced by lower or higher quality units. Specifications (4) to (6) address these concerns using the capital series we constructed from annual real investment. Specification (4) is the standard OLS, specification (5) includes railway FE and specification (6) reports the Levinsohn and Petrin (LP) estimates that control for simultaneity. While the coefficients on labor are similar across the different methods, the coefficients on capital and fuel are quite different. Similar to the original Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) study, we find the LP estimates on capital are higher than OLS (or even the FE in our case) suggesting the latter generates a downward bias on capital elasticity. The OLS estimates on fuel and labor appear to be biased upwards because they are significantly larger than the LP estimates. In general, the FE estimates are in-between the OLS and LP estimates.
14 Across the different methods, we find no evidence of significant economies of scale. Scale economies are small and statistically indistinguishable from zero in all the specifications other than OLS. Many Indian railway systems more than doubled in terms of mileage, employment and vehicles from the 1870s to the 1910s. Greater scale can be attributed to the large territorial area of colonial India. Railway systems could span vast tracts of land without crossing national borders. The regulatory environment for railway consolidation was also favorable because the colonial Government of India actively promoted railway mergers. However, consolidation and internal growth did not increase productive efficiency since economies of scale were limited.
In terms of TFP, the estimates are broadly similar across the specifications and methods. Table 4 reports the correlation coefficients between the railway-level TFP estimates. There is a high correlation between the models with multiple or single capital inputs. The LP estimates are also highly correlated with the IN estimates. While the TFP railway-level estimates are similar across methods, we do find some differences in TFP growth rates. This is to be expected since each method assigns a different weight to labor, capital, and fuel. We now turn to a discussion of industry-level TFP growth and its implications.
Industry TFP
One of the best indicators of performance in the Indian railway sector is the industry TFP growth rate. This measure summarizes railway-level TFP growth and any changes in market structure affecting productivity. Table 5 reports the average annual growth rate of industrylevel TFP by sub-period and across the different estimation methods. Industry-level TFP is the output weighted average of individual railway-level TFP measures as shown in equation (7) . The OLS model with multiple capital inputs yields the most conservative estimate of TFP growth: an average rate of 1.17 percent per year from 1874 to 1912. Since OLS is likely to be biased, we give less weight to this estimate.
The methods that control for potential endogeneity between input choices and unobserved productivity shocks all imply a larger average annual rate of TFP growth as do the IN methods. The FE estimation using the single capital measure shows an average annual TFP growth rate of 1.99 percent while the LP generates an average annual rate of 2.55 percent. Similar to the IN methods, LP also shows a high rate of growth because both methods assign a similar elasticity to fuel. Depending on the choice of methods, the estimates range from 1.2 to 2.7 percent, but the more credibly identified models such as FE and LP suggest a tighter range from 2 to 2.6 percent. At the very least, all the estimates show TFP growth was positive and rapid in the Indian railways sector between 1874 and 1912. argue there was no labor productivity growth in Indian cotton textiles compared to around 2 percent per year in railways (table 2) . Indian railways also look impressive by international standards. Table 6 compares average annual rates of TFP growth for railways in India, Britain, Spain, Canada, and the US. The methodology and time period are also summarized. Strikingly, Indian railways had higher TFP growth than US railways (2.1 percent) and British railways (0.8 percent) using the Index number approach. Canadian railways enjoyed exceptionally high TFP growth beating both the US and India. Our production function estimates generate a slightly higher TFP growth rate of 2.0 percent compared to 1.5 percent for Spanish railways estimated using a variable cost function. Thus, Indian performance in the railway sector matched and in some cases even surpassed the performance in advanced countries. Compared to other sectors of the Indian economy and world standards, railways were the productivity star of the Indian economy.
TFP Growth or Capacity Utilization?
Given the striking performance of Indian railways, one may be concerned whether the increase in TFP reflects true productivity gains such as improvements in organizational and technical efficiency, or whether they reflect increased capacity utilization. Historians and colonial officials alike have argued that Indian railways were built ahead of demand. Traffic was slow in the early decades of railway construction in the 1850s and 1860s and did not pick up until the 1870s or later (Sanyal 1930 ). An increase in utilization after the 1870s could have impacted productivity.
Fishlow (1966) discusses capacity utilization in the case of US railroads and we quote him because he lucidly describes how utilization can influence productivity.
"For capital intensive and capital durable sectors faced with indivisibilities, the size of the capital stock is not a good proxy for the annual flow of services it delivers. At their inception, firms will typically be burdened with higher capital-output ratios than current demand seems to dictate, due both to technical considerations and to positive expectations. Only over time will capital services attain a stable relationship with the magnitude of the stock. . . . Because the capital stock has been used as an input, part of the measured productivity gains of railroads. . . derives from this phenomenon of increasing utilization (p. 630)."
Fishlow goes on to calculate the contribution of capacity utilization by assuming a constant capital to labor ratio. He argues that capital utilization can explain between one-sixth and one-third of productivity growth in US Railroads between 1840 and 1910.
Did capacity utilization play a similar role in India as it did in the US? Indian railways were built ahead of demand similar to some US railroads in the West. The capital-output ratio was large initially and there was a lot of room for greater utilization once output grew.
On the other hand, Indian railways operated in a different economic environment. The Indian economy did not grow as rapidly and so the rate of utilization might have increased more slowly.
We take a different approach to measuring the contribution of utilization to TFP than
Fishlow. The goal of the exercise is to assess the extent of the correlation between utilization and TFP, and whether a significant portion of the variation in TFP is related to utilization.
We do not attempt to attribute a direct causal mechanism between the two. In this exercise, we quantify capacity utilization using micro-data on train miles run per track mile. Track clearly sits idle when trains are not running and so it is a good measure of capacity utilization.
Train miles run per track mile is also ideal because railway track is generally constant in quality; otherwise utilization would be conflated with technological change. TFP, we modify our Cobb-Douglas production function to include a railway-level measure of track utilization. Our approach is similar to other works that measure economies of density by including utilization terms directly in the cost function (Oum, Waters, and Yu 1999).
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After accounting for track utilization, net railway TFP can be calculated by deducting from output the coefficients on the inputs multiplied by the inputs and the coefficient on track utilization multiplied by track utilization. Table 7 reports the coefficients on track utilization across the different models. Unsurprisingly, greater track utilization increases output. In the Cobb-Douglas FE (specification 5), for example, the elasticity of track utilization is 0.52. Although significant, the coefficient is not large enough to explain all the TFP growth. Track utilization increased by 50 percent, but industry-level TFP almost doubled in this period.
TFP growth net of utilization also confirms that capacity utilization is not the major driver of TFP growth. At the bottom of table 7 we report the average rate net TFP growth from 1876 to 1912. We also report the average TFP growth without accounting for utilization for comparison. Average annual TFP growth rates are lower, but not substantially. Track utilization accounts for about 10 to 15 percent of TFP growth in most specifications. 16 Thus, a substantial portion of the TFP growth appears to be unrelated to capacity utilization.
TFP, Organization and Technological Change
The qualitative evidence suggests technological and organization changes were the main drivers of TFP growth. We do not attempt to identify the causal relationship between such changes and TFP, rather we discuss changes in the railways sector during this period that were perhaps correlated with TFP growth. A major organization change over this period was the Government of India (GOI) takeover of a majority of the private railways. The initial network was constructed by privately owned British companies backed by a GOI guarantee. Beginning in 1879, the GOI began to takeover the private companies although many of them were allowed to retain operations under state ownership. By 1912 the GOI had taken over all the former private companies and formed an extensive ownership stake in the railways sector. Over this time, the contribution of railways to state revenues also increased substantially and by 1912 railway revenues accounted for almost 35% of gross state revenues (Bogart and Chaudhary 2011). Hence, it was in the interest of the GOI to improve productivity because it raised profits. In keeping with these goals, numerous commissions were created in this period with the objective of improving railway performance.
The Robertson Report (1903) is one such example. It was a comprehensive survey of Indian railways, which noted that they lagged behind railways in advanced countries like the United States, Canada, and Britain. At this time, Indian railways were using few of the best practice technologies of this period such as automatic vacuum brakes, gas and electrical lighting, high capacity bogie vehicles, and inter-locking signal systems for railway stations. Vacuum brakes were introduced to increase safety. With automatic brakes the entire train 16 Other measures of utilization such as tons per train and passengers per train may be conflated with the quality of the capital stock. But we find strong evidence of net TFP growth even after including these additional variables in the production function.
17 All these adoption rates are constructed from information reported in the Administration Reports on Railways in India for 1900 and 1912. It is difficult to empirically quantify the impact of technological changes on TFP. Hence, we hesitate to attribute a causal relationship between the evidence on technology adoption and higher TFP. This discussion is merely used to illustrate that Indian railways experienced technological change in the late 19th and early 20th century, which may be correlated with the high rates of documented TFP growth. Measuring the effects of government ownership on TFP are also beyond the scope of this paper, but it is worth noting that in other work we find evidence of several operational changes following the transition to Government takeovers, which led to lower labor costs (Bogart and Chaudhary 2011).
Railways and the Indian Economy
In this final section we examine the implications of TFP growth for the Indian economy using the modified growth accounting framework proposed by Crafts (2004) . In this framework the growth of income per capita is divided into a contribution from the railways sector and the non-rail sector:
where s rail is the share of railway profits in national income, ∆(k rail /l) is the growth in railway capital per worker, η is the gross output share of railways, ∆T F P rail is TFP growth in railways, and φ is the gross output share of other sectors. The contribution of railways is equal to the first and third terms. The idea is that railways made a contribution to economic growth through TFP and through additions to the capital stock, which embodied new railway technology.
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The gross output share is equal to nominal railway revenues divided by nominal gross The results are summarized in Table 8 Table 8 shows that railways contributed less to income per capita growth in Britain and Spain. Interestingly all three countries realized the about the same growth contribution from higher TFP, but they had different TFP growth rates. The reason is that railways differed in their share of total output. Indian and Spanish railways were small, while British railways were larger. One implication is that railways could have had a larger impact on the Indian economy if the sector had more than 3 percent share in gross output. Railways
had not yet penetrated much of the Indian economy by 1913. As in the pioneering works of Fogel (1960) and Fishlow (1961) , most economic historians have measured the developmental effect of railways using the social savings methodology.
Our calculations are converted into a similar estimate by multiplying average annual TFP growth by the share of railway revenues in national income. The calculations imply that higher railway TFP increased national income by between 6.0 and 7.7 percent between 1874 and 1912. The large effect of railways in India is similar to Brazil, where Summerhill (2005) finds big social savings. Railways contributed to what little growth there was in these two economies.
Our estimates of the social savings from Indian railways are similar to Hurd (1983) and Donaldson (2010) . These scholars emphasize the lower trade costs brought by railways.
Drawing on differences between rail freight rates and those for bullock carts during the mid19th century, Hurd argued that without railways freight rates would have been between 80 and 90 percent higher. Donaldson gives more precise estimates using an innovative approach with district salt prices. He finds that reliance on road transport increased inter-district price gaps by a factor of 8 relative to rail, implying that railways could lower trade costs by as much as 87 percent in markets that were only served by roads. The estimated effects of river or coastal transport relative to rail are smaller in magnitude (price gaps are nearly 4 times larger), but still quite substantial.
We emphaisze TFP rather than trade costs but the two are intimately connected. Figure   5 shows an index for real average freight revenue per ton mile, a close proxy to real freight charges. 19 The inverse of our single capital FE TFP index is also plotted for comparison. 19 Dividing revenue P*Q by output Q yields an estimate of the average price. Freight rates often differ by time of purchase and commodity. Thus, there is no single market price even for the same trip. Like other series, the index is an output weighted average of the real revenue per ton mile across all railways in each year. We use the Indian consumer price index from Department of Statistics, Commercial Intelligence Department listed in Global Financial Data to deflate revenues. emphasize trade costs, give similar estimates as our calculation which emphasizes TFP. 
Conclusion
Using new data on individual railways, we find strong evidence of TFP growth in Indian railway from 1874 to 1912. Our best estimates suggest that TFP growth averaged between 2 and 2.6 percent per year. The performance of Indian railways is in marked contrast to the stagnant productivity growth in the overall Indian economy and other modern sectors such as cotton textiles. Indian railways compare favorably to railways in the advanced economies of this period such as Britain and the United States.
We also find that the observed TFP growth is not driven purely by an increase in capacity utilization. After accounting for the increase in train miles run per track net TFP growth remains large. The evidence suggests Indian railways adopted several new technologies between 1900 and 1912 bringing them closer to the world technology frontier. Lastly, TFP growth and capital accumulation in railways had a large aggregate impact on the Indian economy. Railways added 0.1 percent per year to Indian income per capita, accounting for 16 percent of the total increase in GDP per capita. As a final remark, it is important to note that the success of Indian railways was short-lived. A number of performance indicators, like ton miles per worker and real freight charges, stagnate or reverse from 1920 to Indian Independence in 1947 (Hurd 2007 ). Thus the hey-day of railways as an 'engines of growth' was largely during the first era of globalization. 20 Donaldson estimates the aggregate social savings from Indian railways to be 9.7 percent of GDP by 1930. Our estimates are probably smaller because we omit spillovers and the effects of switching from overland to rail transport. We also estimate the savings over a shorter time period, 1874 to 1912, and may be missing TFP growth both before and after this period. Lastly, the railway sector increased in size relative to GDP between 1913 and 1930, which would further magnify the effects of railways. 
